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Abstract 
 
Regulators’ expectations to the IFRS introduction are high. In our analyses we measure 
by different variables for market liquidity how inter alia reporting quality and investors’ 
preference developed with IFRS adopter and non IFRS adopter firms over the years, 
starting in the time of the early adoption. The results from around 35,000 firm year 
observations in eleven countries show that only particular adopter firms generally show 
higher liquidity values over the years. Overall we can observe a clear trend. Market 
liquidity values are significantly higher for IFRS adopter firms during the years before 
2005, the year in which reporting of consolidated accounts according to IFRS became 
mandatory for basically all publicly traded companies within the European Union and 
several other countries. Predominantly these values decrease over the years and turn into 
an advance for non IFRS adopter firms in the years after the mandatory adoption. 
Concluding, the results are supportive for the investors’ long term preference, after 
distorting influences during the adoption years, for the non IFRS adopter firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Through the introduction of IFRS3 regulators expect better comparability of financial 
reporting, improvement in reporting quality, hence benefits for the investors (EC Regulation 
No. 1606/2002), and consequently the enhancement of international investments. The aim of 
this paper is to investigate if these expectations were fulfilled in the years around the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS.  
To find evidence we observe several thousand firm years around the world. The focus of the 
study is set on the IFRS adoption in Germany. Firm year observations from around the world 
are used to evaluate our findings. As the effects in the change of quality of financial reporting 
and accompanying investor benefits are supposed to be measurable, among other things, in 
market liquidity, we investigate different representative variables. As proxies for market 
liquidity we employ the proportion of zero returns, total trading costs, the price impact of 
trades, and bid-ask spreads. We choose the period between 2001 and 2007 to concentrate on 
the IFRS adopter groups of voluntary adopters and mandatory adopters. Our focus lies in the 
effects during the time before mandatory adoption, the time of mandatory adoption, and the 
time after mandatory adoption. Changes over time are to be expected when likely distorting 
influences are abolished. These can be the lack of comparability, pre-adoption effects, and 
difficulties in interpreting the reportings as well as influences through expectations and 
investors’ enthusiasm towards the IFRS introduction.  
Due to the fact that IFRS reporting became mandatory to mainly all publicly traded firms in 
Germany at the same time, it is difficult to find the right benchmark which controls for 
changes in the dependent variables that are not related to the adoption of IFRS reporting. We 
therefore choose firms from different countries that did not mandate the introduction of IFRS 
and furthermore did not differ very much from Germany’s economic basic conditions or 
economic development. 
We start with univariate analyses to receive first impressions of what we can expect from later 
regression analyses and of what we should bring into focus. The univariate analyses show a 
surprising development: general strong advances of the IFRS adopters between 2001 and 
2004 which then decrease between 2005 and 2007 partially resulting in a disadvantage. Due 
to these outcomes we decide to divide our second test in two periods: the first until the 
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mandatory IFRS adoption and the second after the mandatory adoption. We run multiple 
regression analyses for the mentioned periods to find that voluntary adopters generally 
maintain their advance for both periods. Later adopters show significantly lower values of 
market liquidity. Furthermore market liquidity declines for all IFRS adopters over the sample 
period. We conduct sensitivity checks and vary the benchmark sample definitions.  In sum, 
the main conclusions are robust, but significance and magnitude are sensitive to the 
benchmark, which underlines the concerns about the right choice of firms to evaluate the 
findings.  
There are different possibilities to interpret the findings. As early and voluntary adopters 
show stronger incentives to introduce IFRS and mandatory adopters are forced and 
consequently less committed, the later group does not entirely implement the IFRS benefits 
and therefore does not show positive capital market effects. The other interpretation is that 
positive consequences for early adopters are not due to the IFRS adoption, but to selection 
effects, as these firms are supposed to be innovative and growing. Our literature review of 
early studies as well as the close examination of our results lead to the conclusion that the 
constant decline of IFRS adopters’ advances and the partial drop of early voluntary adopters’ 
market liquidity values below the benchmark values in the end, is only supportive for the 
investors’ long term preference, after distorting influences during the adoption years, for the 
local (conservative) GAAP accounting.  
The results are to be regarded with caution. Several influences like governance regimes’ 
supports to the IFRS introduction and transitional effects (facilitations for first time adopters 
IFRS 1) as well as current market conditions may have been partially distorting. Keeping 
these in mind, our study shows important evidence and should be of special interest for 
regulators and policy makers. 
 
The unique contribution of this paper is that it examines the effects from the early beginning 
of the IFRS introduction to the time after mandatory adoption. That way we are able to 
truncate distorting influences and to conclude effects on the long run. So far, researchers 
generally investigated introduction effects for the time before mandatory introduction or until 
mandatory introduction.4 The challenge of analysing the time of and after mandatory adoption 
is to find an appropriate benchmark. In finance literature, the time after mandatory adoption 
was only observed as an extract of the entire period and by evaluating the years after the 
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 See Daske et al. (2008) who already examined the effects for the time from 2001 to 2005 or the study from 
Armstrong (2007) observing the time from 2002 to 2005 in the EU. 
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introduction relative to the years before the introduction.5 To our knowledge, we are the first 
to evaluate the findings relative to a contemporaneous worldwide market benchmark for the 
entire period. 
Concluding, we are the first to analyse the effects over a long time and the first to evaluate the 
findings relative to a contemporaneous market benchmark for all extracts of the period. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 delineates our research design. Section 4 describes the 
data and presents the results. Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix, we provide additional 
details on the construction of our key variables. 
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2. Hypothesis Development and Literature Review 
There are three main reactions to be expected from the introduction of IFRS6. One possibility 
is a positive reaction mainly because of a higher reporting quality, higher transparency, lower 
amount of reporting discretion and better comparison possibilities for international analysts. 
All these effects should reduce information asymmetries and estimation risk. 
Another assumption is a negative reaction because of difficulties for the analysts to interpret 
the new standards and respectively the financial statements (e.g. difficulties to forecast 
earnings because of the break in the time-series and difficulties to ascertain fair value 
valuation). Furthermore because of difficulties for the firms to convey information 
(difficulties because IFRS might not be as adapted to the local environment as the prior 
GAAP) and to correctly adopt the standards.  
A further suggestion lies in between the positive and the negative reaction indicating the 
reaction being dependent on the firms’ reporting incentives, which are shaped by many 
factors including the countries’ legal institutions, various market forces and firms’ operating 
characteristics. This argument is derived from the need of considerable judgment for the 
application of accounting standards. 
Our literature review gives first evidence on empirical results for these aspects. 
 
Evidence for positive reactions 
Armstrong et al. (2007) examine the reactions to 16 events between 2002 and 2005 associated 
with the adoption of IFRS in the EU. They find a positive (negative) reaction to events that 
increase (decrease) the likelihood of IFRS adoption. Barth et al. (2008) experience higher 
reporting quality for firms applying IFRS and an improvement in accounting quality after 
firms adopt IFRS. They base their inferences on a sample of firms in 21 countries that 
adopted 
IFRS between the years 1994 and 2003. Daske and Gebhardt (2006) examine the disclosure 
quality for Austrian, German, and Swiss firms from the year 1996 to 2004 and show evidence 
that disclosure quality has increased significantly under IFRS in these three European 
countries. Ernstberger and Vogler (2008) find a lower cost of equity capital for firms in 
Germany voluntarily applying internationally accepted accounting principles in the period 
between 1998 and 2004. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find empirical evidence from the 
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German capital market that increased levels of disclosure lower the information asymmetry 
component of the firm’s cost of capital. Bae et al. (2007) study firms from 49 countries 
between 1998 and 2004 and find evidence that GAAP differences across countries are 
associated with economic costs for financial analysts. The study from Lin and Paananen 
(2007) provides evidence from Germany that the value relevance of earnings and book values 
increases under IFRS, investigating the firms’ earnings and the book value of equity between 
2000 and 2005. 
 
Evidence for negative reactions 
Daske (2006) investigates if internationally recognised financial reporting standards (IFRS or 
US-GAAP) reduce the cost of equity capital for adopting firms. The sample is consistent of 
German firms in the period from 1993 until 2002. He fails to document lower expected cost 
of equity capital for IFRS and US-GAAP adopters equally and finds out that the expected cost 
of equity capital rather increases during the transition period. According to Kaserer and 
Klingler (2008) introducing true and fair view accounting, like IFRS, that relies on difficult-
to-verify information, may not be suitable to improve accounting information quality in the 
context of a weak corporate governance system. Their empirical evidence comes from the 
German capital market investigating reactions to accrual-based accounting information. 
Paananen (2008) assesses no increase in financial reporting quality for firms in Sweden over 
the two first years after the adoption of IFRS in 2005. On the contrary, she finds some 
indications of a decrease in financial reporting quality measured as smoothing of earnings, 
timely loss recognition, and value relevance. When investigating only committed adopters she 
even exploits stronger evidence for the decrease. 
 
Evidence for reactions dependent on countries’ and firms’ characteristics 
Ball (2006) finds out that IFRS Implementation is likely to be heterogeneous across countries 
(e.g. depending on the environment and on firms’ incentives). Daske et al. (2007) hypothesize 
that the economic consequences depend on the extent to which IFRS adoptions represent a 
serious commitment to transparency and find that "serious" adopters experience significantly 
stronger effects on the cost of capital and market liquidity than label adopters. Their sample 
consists of voluntary IFRS adopter firms around the world (24 countries) from 1988 to 2004. 
Daske et al. (2008) support these findings in their worldwide study (26 countries) from 2001 
to 2005 and conclude that reporting quality is shaped by many factors in countries’ 
institutional environments, pointing in particular to the importance of firms’ reporting 
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incentives and countries’ enforcement regimes. Lambert et al. (2007) show that the quality of 
accounting information can influence the cost of capital in either direction, but also derive 
conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline in 
the cost of capital. This evidence is supportive to Hail and Leuz (2006a). They conclude that 
firms from countries with more extensive disclosure requirements, stronger securities 
regulation, and stricter enforcement mechanisms have a significantly lower cost of capital. 
Also firms with cross-listings on U.S. exchanges experience a decrease in their cost of capital 
(Hail and Leuz, 2006b). Christensen et al. (2007) examine the economic consequences for UK 
firms after the European Union's decision to impose mandatory IFRS and show that 
mandatory IFRS adoption does not benefit all firms in a uniform way but results in relative 
winners (e.g. with strong reporting incentives) and losers. Dumontier and Maghraoui (2007) 
investigate for a sample of German firms that switched to IFRS during the 1999-2002 period 
whether the increased accounting disclosures reduces information asymmetry (being proxied 
by bid-ask spreads) among market participants. They find out that switching to IFRS 
increases the information content only of large firms’ financial statements relative to local 
GAAP and that the additional information set related to the new disclosures requires about 
two years to be fully integrated in spreads. Platikanova (2007) studies the IFRS impact on 
market liquidity costs on French, German, Swedish and U.K. stock exchanges. Her results are 
heterogeneous. She finds higher trading costs for U.K. and Swedish firms after 2005. Closing, 
a survey among senior finance executives documents that they are evenly split between 
proponents and opponents to IFRS ((PwC/Ipsos MORI, 2007).  
 
Concluding, we draw the following hypothesises. Firms with strong incentives and in a given 
high quality legal enforcement, as it is the case in Germany, should experience positive 
capital market effects. Moreover effects should be smaller for mandatory adopters and 
stronger for voluntary adopters, assuming stronger incentives for latter firms. Furthermore, 
effects should generally be stronger the more firms apply IFRS and also stronger in the years 
after the mandatory change in the year 2005, when interpreting and analysing difficulties are 
supposed to be minimised. 
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3. Research Design and Data Description 
The study examines the effects of the IFRS introduction by analysing the changes in market 
liquidity for firms in Germany between 2001 and 2007. This measure is chosen as 
representative for the quality of financial reporting.  In the sets of our empirical tests it is 
scaled by different variables which are referred to as the dependent variables.7 The case of 
Germany is of special interest inter alia because of its role in the IFRS adoption process. 
Before 2005, the year when reporting of consolidated accounts according to IFRS became 
mandatory for basically all publicly traded companies within the European Union and several 
further countries, Germany hosted together with Switzerland and Austria more than the half 
of the worldwide population of IFRS reporting firms. The application of IFRS or US-GAAP 
for consolidated accounts were already required for firms listed in the now-defunct growth-
stock segment ‘Neuer Markt’ (new market), which was launched in March 1997. The small-
cap segment SMAX and the quality segment ‘Prime Standard’ adopted this requirement in 
2001 and 2003 respectively.8  Therefore Germany has played an essential role in IFRS-related 
studies (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Daske, 2006; Barth et al., 2008). Moreover the case of 
Germany is of special interest since the expected effects should be particularly strong given 
the reputation of German accounting as being one of the least transparent in the EU. 
First, we conduct univariate analyses. We calculate the mean values of the dependent 
variables for the treatment and the control sample for the different years, compare means of 
(yearly) firm-level changes, and examine t-tests to assess statistical significance.  
Second, we estimate the effects employing multiple regression analyses. We tabulate 
Ordinary Least Squares coefficient estimates between the dependent and independent 
variables. As independent variables we define different IFRS adopter-types (early voluntary, 
late voluntary and first time mandatory) which we use as dummy variables and different 
control variables. We separate the regression analyses into the period from 2001 to 2005 (first 
model) and the period from 2006 to 2007 (second model). In that way we can compare the 
development of the liquidity variables for the time until and the time after the mandatory 
adoption. Further we examine t-tests to assess statistical significance and exercise sensitivity 
analyses by varying the benchmark definitions.9 
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In these examinations, which are described in detail below, we are confronted with several 
empirical challenges. The main challenge is the definition of an accurate benchmark to 
evaluate our results. Due to the fact that IFRS reporting became mandatory to mainly all 
publicly traded firms in Germany from fiscal year ends on or after December 31, 2005, it is 
difficult to find the right benchmark which controls for changes in the dependent variables 
that are unrelated to the adoption of IFRS reporting. We try to respond to this challenge by 
varying the benchmark definitions and the sample countries. 
Another important challenge is that effects of the IFRS introduction may be anticipated. As 
some firms chose to adopt IFRS before it became mandatory, it is likely that effects are 
anticipated by investors and therefore the capital market effects are less evident in the year of 
the mandatory IFRS introduction. Thus we also use in our empirical tests observations prior 
to the mandatory date and moreover split the independent variables to the IFRS adopter types 
from early voluntary and late voluntary to first time mandatory. Another challenge lies in 
possible short-lived adoption effects. At the time of the IFRS introduction e.g. some 
investors may be facing problems in forecasting net earnings under IFRS because of the break 
in the time-series and so negative effects might appear in spite of the improvement of the 
reporting quality. Moreover firms are offered recognition and disclosure exemptions when 
applying IFRS for the first time (see IFRS 1). We try to respond to this challenge by 
observing market effects for the years after the first time adoption of IFRS. Another challenge 
lies in separating concurring effects through higher quality legal enforcement10 and stronger 
firms’ incentives. These effects are revealed by observing switches in reporting at different 
times. As some firms already switched to IFRS before it became mandatory, strong incentives 
under low legal enforcement are suggested with these firms and, respectively, firms that adopt 
IFRS after it became mandatory are expected to have lower incentives (forced to adopt) under 
higher legal enforcement and therefore to show lower effects. 
 
3.1. Univariate Analyses 
First, we divide our sample for the years from 2001 to 2007 into a treatment and a control 
sample. The control sample consists of firms that have not adopted IFRS and the treatment 
sample consists of IFRS adopter firms. Next, we define the dependent variables. We use 
proxies for market liquidity to reflect the quality of financial reporting. The proxy consists of 
four different variables: Zero Returns is the proportion of trading days with zero daily stock 
returns out of all potential trading days in a given year. Illiquidity or price impact is the yearly 
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with strong and weak enforcement. 
 10 
mean of a variation of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure i.e., daily absolute stock return 
divided by trading volume. Total Trading Costs are a comprehensive estimate of yearly 
average round trip transaction costs (including commissions as well as implicit costs from 
short-sale constraints or taxes) based on a series of daily security and aggregate market 
returns, as developed by Lesmond et al. (1999). Bid-Ask Spreads are the yearly median of 
daily quoted spreads, measured at the end of each trading day as the difference between the 
bid price and the ask price divided by the mid-point.11  
The third step is the univariate comparison of the liquidity effects through the introduction of 
IFRS reporting. We therefore compute the difference in our variables between IFRS adopters 
and non-IFRS adopting firms for the years from 2001 to 2007, and then compare the relative 
change over time to show effects resulting from the increasing number of IFRS reporting 
firms or from first IFRS interpreting difficulties.  
We obtain the necessary data to estimate the model from Bloomberg, Datastream, Reuters, 
and the International Monetary Fund. 
 
3.2. Multiple Regression Analyses 
First, we divide the IFRS adopters into different categories. For our first set of analyses we 
divide the adopters into early voluntary, late voluntary, and first time mandatory adopters 
which we use as independent variables. To separate early and late voluntary adopters, we 
consider the announcement of mandatory IFRS Reporting (June 4, 2002) as breakpoint and 
define early voluntary adopters as firms that conducted the IFRS adoption until fiscal year end 
December 31, 2002. Late voluntary adopter firms adopted IFRS on fiscal year ends between 
January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2004. The two mentioned adopter types become to early 
voluntary mandatory and late voluntary mandatory, respectively, for fiscal years ending on or 
after December 31, 2005. First time mandatory adopters applied IFRS for the first time on 
fiscal year ends on or after December 31, 2005. For our second set of analyses we maintain 
the three IFRS adopter types. We differentiate between financial reports that were announced 
early after mandatory and late after mandatory, which refers to the second and third yearly 
financial statements, respectively, after the adoption of IFRS became mandatory. Second, we 
define the benchmark (firms that have not adopted IFRS) to evaluate the findings. The third 
step is, as described in section 3.1, the definition of the dependent variables. Again we use 
Zero Returns, Illiquidity, Total Trading Costs and Bid-Ask Spreads as proxies for market 
liquidity.  
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The final step is the inclusion of fixed effects using control variables. In that way we try to 
control for unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics. We follow Chordia et al. (2000) 
and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and control for firm size, share turnover and return 
variability which we use as main control variables. We additionally add further control 
variables following Doidge et al. (2004) and Lang et al. (2004) who control, among others, 
for firm size, financial leverage and asset growth. The relation to market liquidity for these 
variables is not that close. Therefore we cannot use them as main variables. Furthermore we 
add a market benchmark as control variable, following Daske et al. (2008). The market 
benchmark is computed as yearly mean of the dependent variable from the benchmark 
sample, excluding Germany, to truncate observations from a country that does mandate IFRS. 
 
The variables are combined into the following two regression models.  
First model: 
DepVar i  = β 0  + β 1 Early Voluntary i  + β 2 Late Voluntary i  + β 3 First Time Mandatory i  + 
β 4 Early Voluntary Mandatory i  + β 5 Late Voluntary Mandatory i  + ∑ β j Controls j + ε 
 
Second model: 
DepVar i  = β 0  + β 1 Early Voluntary Early After Mandatory i  + β 2 Early Voluntary Late After 
Mandatory i  + β 3 Late Voluntary Early After Mandatory i  + β 4 Late Voluntary Late After 
Mandatory i  + β 5 First Time Mandatory Early After Mandatory i  + β 6 First Time Mandatory 
Late After Mandatory i  + ∑ β j Controls j + ε 
 
DepVar stands for the different dependent variables Zero Returns, Illiquidity, Total Trading 
Costs, and Bid-Ask Spreads. We obtain the necessary data to estimate the model from 
Bloomberg, Datastream, Reuters, and the International Monetary Fund. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Sample Selection and Description 
In our sample we observe firms with fiscal years ending on or after January 1, 2001, through 
December 31, 2007. We start in 2001 to cover potential IFRS adoption effects. As treatment 
sample we choose all listed firms from Germany applying IFRS, provided that data is 
available and market capitalization is at least EUR 10 million. We choose the criteria of 
market capitalization because data from benchmark countries is in some cases not available 
for smaller firms and in this way the treatment and the control sample are better comparable. 
In the end, after dropping special (preferred) securities, our treatment sample consists of about 
8,000 firm year observations from 774 unique firms. The firm year observations are split into 
48% early voluntary, 33% late voluntary and 19% mandatory IFRS adoptions.  
Selecting the control sample, we choose firms from Germany that have not yet adopted IFRS 
as well as firms from countries that have not switched to IFRS. Voluntary IFRS adopters from 
these countries are dropped. Using these countries as a benchmark, we concentrate on 
countries that show a similar GDP development to Germany for the entire investigation 
period. As base model we select, like Daske et al. (2008), the benchmark from a randomly 
drawn sample of up to 150 firms from each benchmark country.12 This approach disallows 
strong effects from any particular country that might e.g. be due to country specific regulatory 
changes. Above all we run different sensitivity tests by varying the composition of the 
benchmark.  
Concluding, we select from a sample that comprises more than 35,000 firm year observations 
from 2,125 unique firms. All the countries and the number of firms observed in the treatment 
and the control sample as well as the accounting standards are reported in Table 1. Table 2 
provides a compendium of the potential countries for the control sample and the countries’ 
GDP developments from the year 2001 to the year 2007. Table 3 presents descriptive 
statistics on the dependent and independent variables for the entire sample. We exclude values 
outside the 1% and the 99% percentile.  
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 When data is available for several thousand firms from one country (like Japan or the U.S), we sample these 
firms in advance keeping our benchmark base model definition in mind. We then download data for a sufficient 
number of firms (up to about 300), guaranteeing in that way that yearly data for at least 150 firms can be used 
for calculating. 
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4.2 Average Effects of IFRS Introduction Based on Firm Year Analyses 
4.2.1 Univariate Analyses 
First, we perform univariate comparisons to obtain an early impression of IFRS adoption 
effects. We calculate our dependent variables for market liquidity (proportion of zero return 
days, illiquidity, trading costs, and bid-ask spreads) for IFRS adopters and non-IFRS adopters 
from 2001 to 2007. We use t-tests to measure statistical significance for the resulting 
differences between the treatment and the control sample. In Table 4 we report the mean 
values for our variables and the differences between the treatment and the control sample over 
the years, indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with ***, **, and *, 
respectively. In average, the variables for liquidity show higher values for the IFRS adopter 
firms than for the non IFRS adopters. Furthermore, we clearly notice the trend for decreasing 
differences between the sample groups over the years. As the differences are quite big in the 
first years of the investigation, they strongly decrease in the years 2006 and 2007. During the 
last two years of our study, the variables for illiquidity and bid-ask spreads even show higher 
values of market liquidity for the non IFRS adopter firms. For instance, the percentage of bid-
ask spreads in the year 2005 is 1.93% for IFRS adopters and it increases to 2.19% and 2.62% 
in the years 2006 and 2007, respectively. The opposite change takes place within the control 
sample. The bid-ask spreads decrease from 2.14% in 2005 to 1.77% in 2006 and to 1.72% in 
2007. Consequently, in 2007, the bid-ask spreads are 0.90% higher for the IFRS adopter 
firms, statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating lower market liquidity. This sample 
is based on 490 IFRS adopters and 890 non IFRS adopters. The values are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.   
Concluding, the univariate analysis of market liquidity suggests that advantages for IFRS 
adopters on the capital market decreased over the years, partially even resulting in 
disadvantages since the year 2006.  
 
4.2.2 Analyses of Liquidity Consequences 
4.2.3 Until Mandatory Adoption 
In table 5 we present the results for the OLS coefficient estimates. The t-statistics in 
parentheses indicate statistical significance. For the liquidity variables the estimates are all 
negative with only one exception for the first time mandatory illiquidity variable. The values 
are predominantly statistically significant, clearly demonstrating the higher market liquidity 
for IFRS adopter firms in the years 2001 to 2005. Furthermore, we can report differences 
within the three adopter groups. In average, the market liquidity is higher for early voluntary 
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adopters than for late voluntary adopters and latter still show higher values than the first time 
mandatory adopters. For example, first time mandatory adopters’ proportion of zero return 
days decreases by 155 basis points compared to the pre-adoption median of 27.94%. This is a 
diminution of 5,55%, significant at the 5% level. For early voluntary adopter firms, the 
proportion of zero return days goes down by 449 basis points in that time, even though they 
were already 324 basis points lower in the years before the mandatory change. Late voluntary 
adopters first decrease 256 basis points and after the adoption date further 288 basis points.13 
The mentioned changes for early and late voluntary adopters are all significant at the 1% 
level. Concerning the bid-ask spreads, we can again see a stronger increase in market 
liquidity for voluntary adopters. Early voluntary adopters go up by 2% over the entire 
treatment period, significant at the 10% and 1% level for the first and second part of the 
period, respectively. Late voluntary adopters go up by 2.4%, significant at the 1% level for 
the entire period.  
We also run different sensitivity analyses that we do not tabulate. We vary the benchmark 
definitions by excluding observations from Germany and US.GAAP observations, and by 
reducing the benchmark sample. In sum, the main conclusions do not need to be rejected, but 
significance and magnitude are sensitive to the benchmark, which underlines the concerns 
about the right choice of firms to evaluate the findings, as discussed in section 3. 
Concluding, the hypothesis that firms with strong incentives – assuming voluntary adopters as 
firms with strong incentives – are to experience positive capital market effects, can be 
supported. Also the hypothesis, that mandatory adopter firms are to expect weaker capital 
market effects, as showing low or no incentives, can be confirmed. Compared to the time 
before the adoption became mandatory, voluntary adopters for all investigated variables 
experience an even stronger increase in market liquidity. This supports the hypothesis of 
positive effects through better comparability, when more firms apply IFRS.  
In sum, all IFRS adopter firms show higher market liquidity values in average, compared to 
the non IFRS adopter firms, thereby marking stronger values for voluntary adopters. The 
results as well as the main control variables, which are market value, share turnover, and 
return variability, are statistically generally highly significant.  
 
                                                 
13The changes are calculated, for instance, as e 057,0)2794,0ln( − = 0,2639 for first time mandatory adopters, and as 
e
201,0123,0)2794,0ln( −−
= 0,2021 for early voluntary mandatory adopters, respectively. 
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4.2.4 After Mandatory Adoption 
In table 6 we report the effects for the time after the mandatory IFRS adoption year. Adoption 
effects or hurdles through the lack of comparability are supposed to be eliminated. What we 
see is what we partially could suggest through the first indications in the univariate analyses, 
but it is still surprising. Throughout all the liquidity variables we generally see the same 
pattern: a decrease of market liquidity (relative to the benchmark) compared to the time of the 
mandatory adoption14 and also a decrease compared to the time before the mandatory 
adoption15. As early voluntary adopters generally still maintain their advance over the 
benchmark sample, late voluntary adopters, especially for the time late after mandatory, lose 
their advance. For instance, compared to the median of 1.77% after the mandatory adoption 
year, the bid-ask spread of late voluntary adopters first increases 0.35 basis points (but not 
statistically significant) and further 1.37 basis points (significant at the 1% level) in the time 
late after mandatory. This equates to an augmentation of 0.97% in the bid-ask spreads 
variable. Regarding the proportion of zero return days for first time mandatory adopter firms, 
they first increase by 48 basis points and for the time late after mandatory by further 54 basis 
points, significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. This equates to an increase of 6,3% 
in the proportion of zero return days variable, relative to the zero return post-adoption median.  
The investigated variables are not always statistically significant. Especially the results for the 
late voluntary adopters cannot be definitely due to the IFRS effects. The main control 
variables (market value, share turnover, and return variability) are generally statistically 
highly significant. 
Again, we run different sensitivity analyses and vary the benchmark definitions by e.g. 
excluding observations from Germany and US.GAAP observations. Here again the main 
assertions can be retained, but, as already mentioned in section 4.2.3., significance and 
magnitude are sensitive to the benchmark. 
Concluding, the hypothesis that firms with strong incentives should experience stronger 
positive capital market effects can again be maintained. Results in the liquidity variables are 
always higher for voluntary adopters than for mandatory adopters. Surprisingly, the 
hypothesis that effects should generally be stronger in the years after the mandatory change, 
when interpreting and analysing difficulties are supposed to be minimised, cannot be 
confirmed. In contrast, the liquidity variables that showed strongly higher values before and 
                                                 
14
 There is one exception. The early voluntary adopters’ measure of illiquidity still slightly decreases compared 
to the time of the mandatory adoption. 
15
 Again the early voluntary adopters’ measure of illiquidity is the exception. Further the early voluntary 
adopters’ measure of trading costs is in the first year after the mandatory adoption slightly below the measure 
during the time before the mandatory adoption. 
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until the mandatory adoption year declined in the years after the mandatory adoption. The 
majority of the investigated variables even lost their advance relative to the benchmark 
sample. Possibly, on the long run conservative accounting, with all its possible disadvantages, 
remains the preferred reporting basis. This result may be strongly influenced by the volatile 
and fragile market conditions resulting from the financial crisis. 
In sum, these liquidity results seem to demonstrate that after starting and interpreting 
difficulties are cured and the application of IFRS is established, investors prefer trading non 
IFRS adopter firms.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article we investigate the effects of the IFRS introduction focusing on market liquidity 
as effects in the change of quality of financial reporting are supposed to be measurable in this 
proxy. 
For early voluntary adopters the effects are, in general, positive for the entire period. 
Advances relative to the benchmark sample vary from very strong advances during the first 
adoption years to very low advances, partially even disadvantages during the last years of the 
investigated period. The results for late voluntary adopters or mandatory adopters become 
even clearer. These adopter firms start the IFRS adoption in general with low advances 
relative to the benchmark sample and turn their advance into a disadvantage within a short 
time. The results are generally statistically significant and robust to various sensitivity checks. 
Magnitude and significance vary with the change of the benchmark definitions. 
Concluding, mainly only early voluntary adopters showed significantly higher values for 
market liquidity over time. This suggests that either very committed adopters really do profit 
from IFRS or that these advances can be as well due to selection effects because firms 
adopting IFRS for such a long time before it was mandated are supposed to be innovative and 
rising. In the end, also market liquidity for early voluntary adopters declines. Therefore it 
seems, excluding short time effects, that investors prefer trading stocks from firms that adopt 
GAAP which is used and perhaps more appropriate to local market conditions. The results of 
this study may be strongly pushed through current market conditions and investors’ probable 
preference towards conservative and cautious accounting. 
This paper contributes to the political debate about risks and chances of IFRS and illustrates 
economic consequences of a forced GAAP adoption. 
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Appendix: Measurement of the Dependent Variables 
 
A.1 Proportion of Zero Return Days 
The first variable we use to measure the market liquidity is the proportion of zero returns. It 
reflects the proportion of trading days with zero daily stock returns out of all potential trading 
days in a given year. This measure is frequently used in finance studies.16 It is argued that 
investors only trade, if the value of information is worth more than the cost of trading17. 
Consequently, if firms applying the IFRS reporting standards are supposed to better transfer 
information, they should show less zero trading days. 
When computing yearly values, we follow Daske et al. (2008) and define the measurement 
period from month -5 to month +7 relative to the firm’s fiscal year end to account for IFRS 
information in interim reports and to ensure that the firms’ annual reports are publicly 
available and priced at the time of computations. 
We collect daily stock price and applied reporting standard data from Bloomberg, fiscal year 
end data from Reuters. We compared the applied reporting standard data from Datastream to 
the data from Bloomberg. Differences were investigated by looking up the firms’ financial 
reports on the firms’ websites. 
  
A.2 Illiquidity (or Price Impact) Metric 
The illiquidity measure, proposed by Amihud (2002) and, in turn, inspired by Kyle’s (1985) 
lambda, is the daily ratio of absolute stock price return in percent to U.S. dollar volume. This 
measure gives the price impact of each dollar traded on the stock price. As tested in Amihud’s 
(2002) study, the price impact or the return increases in illiquidity.18 This increase can be 
partially interpreted as premium to compensate for the lower liquidity of stocks relative to that 
of Treasury securities. Following, firms applying IFRS, considered as firms with liquid 
stocks, are supposed to have a lower return to trading volume ratio than the benchmark firms.  
Different from Amihud (2002) we calculate the illiquidity measure as the daily ratio of 
absolute stock price change in local currency to trading volume, again in local currency (and 
not each in USD). The advantage of this method is to avoid effects of variations in exchange 
rates between the U.S. dollar and foreign currency. Through this change, our resulting 
parameter will not be the exact price impact per each dollar traded. But as we use this 
measure to compare market liquidity relative to the benchmark firms, the modified method is 
                                                 
16
 Goyenko et al. (2005), Lesmond (2005), Bekaert et al. (2006). 
17
 Lesmond et al. (1999). 
18
 see also e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986). 
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best for our research. When calculating the measure we use the yearly median of all daily 
ratios (multiplied 10,000). Again we define the measurement period from month -5 to month 
+7 relative to the firm’s fiscal year end. We collect daily stock price, and trading volume data 
from Bloomberg, applied reporting standard data from Bloomberg and Datastream, and fiscal 
year end data from Reuters. 
 
A.3 Lesmond et al. (1999) Total Trading Costs 
Their model is based on the premise that if the value of the information signal is insufficient 
to exceed the costs of trading, then the marginal investor will either reduce trading or not 
trade, causing a zero return. Therefore, a security with high transaction costs will have less 
frequent price movements and more zero returns than a security with low transaction costs. 
Consequently the estimates from the model are the marginal trader’s effective transaction 
costs. Lesmond et al. (1999) use the limited dependent variable (LDV) model of Tobin (1958) 
and Rosett (1959). They assume the common market model to be the correct model for 
security returns, but it is constrained by the effects of transaction costs and therefore the true 
return deviates from the measured return, when the value of information is too low to exceed 
the transaction costs.  They demonstrate the relation between measured returns, R jt , and true 
returns, R *jt , as 
R *jt  = β j * R mt + є jt , 
where 
R jt  = R
*
jt –α j1  if R
*
jt  < α j1  
R jt  = 0  if α j1  < R
*
jt < α j2  
R jt  = R
*
jt  –α j2  if R
*
jt  > α j2 . 
The threshold for trades on negative information is α j1  and for positive information α j2 . 
Accordingly, if α j1   < β j * R mt + є jt  < α j2 , the measured return on the security will be zero 
because the true (negative) return is too small to exceed the transaction costs for selling and 
the true (positive) return is too small to exceed the transaction costs for buying. The market 
return is R mt  and the residual term to capture all further information not contained in the 
market return is є jt . Replacing these terms into the corresponding likelihood function 
(assumed that daily stock returns are normally distributed), calculating the logarithm of the 
likelihood function and finally maximizing the last mentioned solves the parameters of 
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interest, α j1 and α j2 . The measure of the total round trip transaction costs associated with 
security j is α j2  - α j1 . Assuming higher market liquidity for IFRS adopters, they are supposed 
to show lower transaction costs. We exercise these calculations for each firm and year using 
daily stock returns and equally weighted local market index returns. When computing yearly 
values, we again define the measurement period from month -5 to month +7 relative to the 
firm’s fiscal year end. We also follow Lesmond (2005) and require at least 20% of the daily 
returns to be different from zero per firm-year observation. 
Data of stock prices and the respective home country market index are obtained from 
Bloomberg, fiscal year end data from Reuters, and data of the applied reporting standards 
from Bloomberg and Datastream. 
 
A.4 Bid-Ask Spreads 
The variable for bid-ask spreads is the yearly median of daily quoted spreads, measured at the 
end of each trading day as the difference between the bid price and the ask price divided by 
the mid-point. This variable is frequently used in studies as measure for market liquidity (e.g., 
Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Keim and Madhavan, 1996; Eleswarapu, 1997). Considering 
firms applying IFRS as firms with liquid stocks, they are supposed to have lower bid-ask 
spreads than the benchmark firms. 
When computing yearly values, we again define the measurement period from month -5 to 
month +7 relative to the firm’s fiscal year end. We collect applied reporting standards data 
from Bloomberg and Datastream, bid and ask price data from Bloomberg and fiscal year end 
data from Reuters. 
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Table 1. Sample Composition 
 
       
 
  
              
  
        
 
Panel A: Firms per Country    Panel B: Accounting Standards per Year 
 
 
   
    
 
Sample Countries 
Unique 
Firms Firm-Years  Year Observations US. GAAP IFRS 
Further 
GAAP 
Germany 774 5418  2001 1285 13% 10% 77% 
Japan 332 1050       
United States 186 1050  2002 1302 13% 11% 76% 
Mexico 51 357       
Canada 252 1050  2003 1325 12% 14% 74% 
Israel 100 700       
Brazil 204 1050  2004 1352 12% 23% 65% 
New Zealand 117 819       
Chile 40 280  2005 1404 12% 28% 60% 
Colombia 29 203       
Egypt 40 280  2006 1481 11% 31% 58% 
         
    2007 1590 10% 33% 57% 
         
Total 2125 12257  Total 9739 12% 22% 66% 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
The sample period starts in 2001 and ends in 2007. As treatment sample we choose firms from Germany with a market capitalization of at least 
EUR 10 million. The benchmark sample consists of firms from non-IFRS adoption countries as well as firms from Germany that do not apply IFRS. 
For the selection of the benchmark countries see Table 2. When we gather data for the benchmark countries and data is available for several 
thousand firms from one country (like Japan or the U.S), we sample these firms in advance, keeping our benchmark base model definition in mind 
(a maximum of 150 firms per country). We then download data for only a sufficient number of firms, guaranteeing in that way that yearly data for at 
least 150 firms can be used for calculating. In Panel A we report the number of firms from each country. In Panel B the number and percentage of 
observations are reported for the entire sample per year, separating the sample into IFRS and U.S.GAAP observations. We obtain the necessary data 
to estimate the model from Bloomberg, Datastream, Reuters and the International Monetary Fund. For detailed data descriptions see the appendix. 
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Table 2. Benchmark Selection 
Panel A: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Constant Prices, Annual Percentage Change     
Non-IFRS Adoption 
Countries 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Sum Mean 
Germany 1.239 0.011 -0.269 1.058 0.763 2.882 2.534 8.218 1.174 
Japan 0.184 0.262 1.414 2.744 1.934 2.424 2.107 11.069 1.581 
United States 0.751 1.599 2.510 3.637 3.070 2.871 2.189 16.627 2.375 
Mexico -0.033 0.772 1.390 4.229 2.844 4.813 3.288 17.303 2.472 
Canada 1.784 2.925 1.881 3.070 3.066 2.759 2.653 18.138 2.591 
Israel -0.426 -0.642 2.252 5.195 5.294 5.210 5.277 22.160 3.166 
Brazil 1.132 2.658 1.147 5.716 3.158 3.754 5.417 23.160 3.309 
New Zealand 2.703 5.187 3.449 4.528 2.785 1.546 2.993 23.191 3.313 
Taiwan -2.171 4.637 3.500 6.153 4.161 4.888 5.696 26.864 3.838 
Argentina -4.409 -10.895 8.837 9.030 9.179 8.466 8.659 28.867 4.124 
Chile 3.527 2.159 3.972 5.984 5.714 3.966 5.008 30.330 4.333 
Colombia 1.472 1.934 3.858 4.867 4.722 6.785 7.000 30.638 4.377 
Egypt 3.524 3.186 3.193 4.092 4.472 6.844 7.088 32.399 4.628 
Korea 3.837 6.970 3.097 4.730 4.198 5.134 4.973 32.939 4.706 
Sri Lanka -1.545 3.965 6.020 5.447 6.030 7.353 6.293 33.563 4.795 
Turkey -5.697 6.164 5.265 9.363 8.402 6.893 4.950 35.340 5.049 
Thailand 2.167 5.318 7.140 6.344 4.526 5.107 4.753 35.355 5.051 
Indonesia 3.643 4.499 4.780 5.031 5.693 5.510 6.316 35.472 5.067 
Malaysia 0.518 5.391 5.789 6.783 4.997 5.934 6.327 35.739 5.106 
Peru 0.215 5.020 4.032 5.111 6.745 7.557 8.986 37.666 5.381 
Pakistan 1.982 3.224 4.846 7.369 7.667 6.920 6.381 38.389 5.484 
Russia 5.100 4.700 7.300 7.200 6.400 7.400 8.100 46.200 6.600 
India 3.886 4.555 6.857 7.885 9.130 9.746 9.213 51.272 7.325 
China 8.300 9.100 10.000 10.100 10.400 11.100 11.400 70.400 10.057 
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Table 2. (Continued)          
Panel B: Countries with closest GDP annual percentage difference per year compared to Germany       
average closest 
country per year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
The ten closest 
countries compared 
per year and over the 
years 
United States Malaysia Israel Germany Germany Germany 
New 
Zealand Japan Japan 
Canada 
United 
States Germany Brazil Japan Japan Japan 
United 
States United States 
Japan Germany Japan Mexico Canada 
New 
Zealand Canada Germany Mexico 
Mexico Brazil Mexico Japan 
United 
States Mexico 
United 
States Canada Canada 
Brazil Colombia 
United 
States Canada Egypt Canada Germany 
New 
Zealand Israel 
Chile Canada Colombia Israel Mexico 
United 
States Brazil Mexico Brazil 
Colombia Pakistan Chile 
United 
States 
New 
Zealand Brazil Chile Thailand New Zealand 
Israel        Chile 
Egypt        Colombia 
New Zealand        Egypt 
Malaysia          
Pakistan          
Thailand                   
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Table 2. (Continued) 
In Panel A we report the GDP for the possible benchmark countries that do not mandate IFRS for the years 2001 to 2007. The countries were 
chosen from Daske et al. (2008), table 1, that shows non IFRS adoption countries. GDP data is collected from the International Monetary Fund.  In 
Panel B we show the countries that, per year, deviate the least from Germany's GDP. It is sufficient, to show six countries per year to obtain a final 
benchmark composition of ten countries. We can only select ten out of the twenty three tabulated countries to avoid unacceptable variances. As 
constant benchmark we choose the ten countries that in average over the years as well as in average compared per year showed the closest GDP 
percentage change compared to Germany. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Investigated Variables      
 
           
  N Mean Std. Dev P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Dependent Variables 
        
Zero Returns 9.614 22.16% 23.63% 3.07% 6.15% 10.81% 29.89% 95.02% 
 
        
Illiquidity 9.623 1.355 10.129 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.089 26.500 
 
        
Total Trading Costs 9.093 3.86% 5.17% 0.51% 1.22% 2.02% 4.41% 24.59% 
 
        
Bid-Ask Spreads 8.571 3.10% 7.45% 0.03% 0.62% 1.57% 3.39% 26.80% 
 
        
 
        
Independent Control Variables 
       
Market Value 9.236 3,740 13,359 3 43 319 1,906 64,332 
         
Share Turnover 9.236 0.777 2.643 0.002 0.129 0.398 0.887 5.215 
         
Return Variability 9.576 0.026 0.017 0.008 0.016 0.022 0.031 0.086 
         
Total Assets 9.439 10,119 62,068 0 63 373 2,622 182,696 
         
Financial Leverage 9.056 0.559 0.238 0.043 0.398 0.568 0.720 0.999 
         
Asset Growth 9.623 10.10% 38.31% -68.75% -1.97% 5.20% 16.31% 142.01% 
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Table 3. (Continued) 
The sample period starts in 2001 and ends in 2007. As treatment sample we choose firms from Germany with a market capitalization of at least 
EUR 10 million. The benchmark sample consists of firms from non-IFRS adoption countries as well as firms from Germany that do not mandate the 
application of IFRS. For the selection of the benchmark countries see Table 2. We use proxies for market liquidity to reflect the quality of financial 
reporting. The proxies consist of four different variables: Zero Returns is the proportion of trading days with zero daily stock returns out of all 
potential trading days in a given year. Illiquidity or price impact is the yearly mean of a variation of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure i.e., daily 
absolute stock return divided by trading volume (we multiply the coefficient by 10,000 for expositional purpose). Total Trading Costs are a 
comprehensive estimate of yearly average round trip transaction costs based on a series of daily security and aggregate market returns, as developed 
by Lesmond et al. (1999). Bid-Ask Spreads are the yearly median of daily quoted spreads, measured at the end of each trading day as the difference 
between the bid price and the ask price divided by the mid-point. We define the control variables as follows: Market Value is stock price (in EUR) 
times the number of shares outstanding. We compute share turnover as annual EUR trading volume divided by market value of outstanding equity. 
Return variability is the annual standard deviation of daily stock returns (ln). Total assets are reported in EUR millions. Financial Leverage is the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Asset Growth describes the one-year percentage change in total assets. Market Benchmark is defined as yearly 
mean of the dependent variable from observations in countries that do not mandate the adoption of IFRS (benchmark sample, excluded observations 
from Germany). We obtain the necessary data to estimate the model from Bloomberg, Datastream, Reuters and the International Monetary Fund. 
For detailed data descriptions see the appendix. 
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Table 4. Univariate Analyses 
 
                  
  2001     2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=122 (i) 16.89% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=142 (i) 19.7% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=175 (i) 14.19% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=297 (i) 15.14% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=373 (i) 14.13% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=441 (i) 14.43% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=479 (i) 16.07% zero  
return Non 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=1145 (ii) 31.00% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=1121 (ii) 30.39% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=1098 (ii) 26.76% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=979 (ii) 22.51% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=952 (ii) 19.2% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=953 (ii) 15.97% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=1007 (ii) 16.88% 
  
(i)-(ii) 14.11%*** (i)-(ii) 10.69%*** (i)-(ii) 12.57%*** (i)-(ii) 7.37%*** (i)-(ii) 5.07%*** (i)-(ii) 1.54%* (i)-(ii) 0.81% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=122 (i) 3.938 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=145 (i) 5.235 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=176 (i) 3.148 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=310 (i) 3.691 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=382 (i) 5.179 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=447 (i) 7.528 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=490 (i) 11.606 illi-
quidity Non 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=1141 (ii) 5.897 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=1137 (ii) 7.563 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=1123 (ii) 6.656 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=999 (ii) 5.342 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=955 (ii) 6.171 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=959 (ii) 7.282 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=1031 (ii) 5.758 
  
(i)-(ii) 1.959* (i)-(ii) 2.328** (i)-(ii) 3.508*** (i)-(ii) 1.651* (i)-(ii) 0.992 (i)-(ii) -0.246 (i)-(ii) -5.848*** 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=122 (i) 5.05% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=143 (i) 5.84% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=177 (i) 3.69% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=300 (i) 3.30% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=370 (i) 2.61% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=437 (i) 2.42% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=476 (i) 3.21% trading  
costs Non 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=1023 (ii) 5.15% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=1040 (ii) 5.40% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=1050 (ii) 4.29% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=942 (ii) 3.33% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=908 (ii) 2.62% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=920 (ii) 2.25% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=993 (ii) 2.53% 
  
(i)-(ii) 0.10% (i)-(ii) -0.44% (i)-(ii) 0.60%*** (i)-(ii) 0.03% (i)-(ii) 0.01% (i)-(ii) -0.17% (i)-(ii) -0.68%*** 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=122 (i) 3.32% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=144 (i) 3.5% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=175 (i) 3.07% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=309 (i) 2.11% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=381 (i) 1.93% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=446 (i) 2.19% 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=490 (i) 2.62% bid-ask 
spread Non 
IFRS 
Adopters 
N=943 (ii) 3.60% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=999 (ii) 3.67% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=983 (ii) 3.19% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=862 (ii) 2.4% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=815 (ii) 2.14% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=816 (ii) 1.77% 
Non IFRS 
Adopters 
N=890 (ii) 1.72% 
  
(i)-(ii) 0.28% (i)-(ii) 0.17% (i)-(ii) 0.12% (i)-(ii) 0.29%** (i)-(ii) 0.21%* (i)-(ii) -0.42%*** (i)-(ii) -0.90%*** 
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Table 4. (Continued) 
The table reports the mean values for the dependent variables, the number of observations and the differences between the treatment and the control 
sample from the year 2001 to 2007, indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with ***, **, and *, respectively, based on the 
approximative two-sided t-test from Gauß. The treatment sample consists of all German firms, applying IFRS, with a market capitalization of at 
least EUR 10 million. The benchmark companies are randomly selected from the benchmark countries. A maximum of 150 companies per country 
is selected. The dependent variables are: (1) Zero Returns is the proportion of trading days with zero daily stock returns out of all potential trading 
days in a given year. (2) Illiquidity or price impact is the yearly mean of a variation of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure i.e., daily absolute 
stock return divided by trading volume. (3) Total Trading Costs are a comprehensive estimate of yearly average round trip transaction costs based 
on a series of daily security and aggregate market returns, as developed by Lesmond et al. (1999). (4) Bid-Ask Spreads are the yearly median of 
daily quoted spreads, measured at the end of each trading day as the difference between the bid price and the ask price divided by the mid-point. We 
obtain the necessary data to estimate the model from Bloomberg, Datastream, Reuters and the International Monetary Fund. For detailed data 
descriptions see the appendix. 
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Table 5. Regression Analyses Until Mandatory Adoption    
Independent Variables    
  
  
Proportion of Zero 
Return Days Illiquidity Total Trading Costs Bid-Ask Spread 
IFRS Adopters 
    
Early Voluntary -0.123*** -0.252** -0.002 -0.003* 
 (-11.292) (-2.535) (-0.914) (-1.859) 
Late Voluntary -0.096*** -0.147 -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-5.392) (-0.906) (-2.862) (-3.446) 
First Time Mandatory -0.057** 1.059*** -0.008 -0.008* 
 (-1.995) (3.965) (-1.322) (-1.674) 
Early Voluntary Mandatory -0.201*** -0.478** -0.026*** -0.017*** 
 (-9.709) (-2.546) (-6.659) (-4.721) 
Late Voluntary Mandatory -0.120*** -0.220 -0.019*** -0.014*** 
 (-6.179) (-1.253) (-4.920) (-4.309) 
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Table 5. (Continued) 
 
Control Variables 
Log (Market Value t-1) -0.056*** 0.063** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (-25.733) (2.433) (-18.187) (-18.858) 
Log (Share Turnover t-1) -0.054*** -0.310*** -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 (-37.310) (-17.349) (-23.565) (-16.372) 
Log (Return Variability t-1) -0.072*** -0.091 0.024*** 0.014*** 
 (-14.712) (-1.489) (22.395) (13.563) 
Log (Total Assets) -0.002 -0.245*** -0.001 0.002*** 
 (-1.077) (-9.169) (-1.477) (4.459) 
Financial Leverage 0.041*** 0.910*** 0.013*** 0.004* 
 (3.647) (6.475) (5.682) (1.759) 
Asset Growth -0.013 -0.303*** -0.011*** -0.006*** 
 (-1.604) (-2.951) (-6.700) (-3.499) 
Market Benchmark 0.955*** 0.961 0.641*** 0.443*** 
 (11.417) (0.331) (10.873) (5.294) 
R 0.728 0.336 0.696 0.547 
R square 0.530 0.113 0.484 0.300 
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Table 5. (Continued) 
The sample period starts in 2001 and ends in 2007. As treatment sample we choose firms from Germany with a market capitalization of at least 
EUR 10 million. The benchmark sample consists of firms from non-IFRS adoption countries as well as firms from Germany that do not mandate the 
application of IFRS. For the selection of the benchmark countries see Table 2. We split the IFRS observations into three groups: (1) Early Voluntary 
comprises the firms switching to IFRS between the years 2001 and 2002. (2) Late Voluntary includes all firms switching to IFRS between the years 
2003 and 2004. (3) First time mandatory marks all firms applying IFRS for the first time in 2005, the year when it became mandatory in Germany. 
Early Voluntary Mandatory and Late Voluntary Mandatory refer to the Early and Late Voluntary adopters' performance in the year 2005. We use 
proxies for market liquidity to reflect the quality of financial reporting. The proxies consist of four different variables: Zero Returns is the 
proportion of trading days with zero daily stock returns out of all potential trading days in a given year. Illiquidity or price impact is the yearly mean 
of a variation of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure i.e., daily absolute stock return divided by trading volume (we multiply the coefficient by 
10,000 for expositional purpose). Total Trading Costs are a comprehensive estimate of yearly average round trip transaction costs based on a series 
of daily security and aggregate market returns, as developed by Lesmond et al. (1999). Bid-Ask Spreads are the yearly median of daily quoted 
spreads, measured at the end of each trading day as the difference between the bid price and the ask price divided by the mid-point. We define the 
control variables as follows: Market Value is stock price (in EUR) times the number of shares outstanding. We compute share turnover as annual 
EUR trading volume divided by market value of outstanding equity. Return variability is the annual standard deviation of daily stock returns. Total 
assets are reported in EUR millions. Financial Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Asset Growth describes the one-year percentage 
change in total assets. Market Benchmark is defined as yearly mean of the dependent variable from observations in countries that do not mandate 
the adoption of IFRS (benchmark sample, excluded observations from Germany). For the first four mentioned control variables we use the natural 
log of the raw values. Where indicated, we lag the variables by one year. Statistical significance is indicated at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with ***, 
**, and *, respectively, based on the approximative two-sided t-test from Gauß (t-statistics in parentheses). We obtain the necessary data to estimate 
the model from Bloomberg, Datastream, Reuters and the International Monetary Fund. For detailed data descriptions see the appendix. 
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Table 6. Regression Analyses After Mandatory Adoption    
     
Independent Variables    
  
  
Proportion of Zero 
Return Days Illiquidity 
Total Trading 
Costs Bid-Ask Spread 
IFRS Adopters 
    
     
Early Voluntary Early After Mandatory -0.065*** -0.483* -0.005*** 0.002 
 (-4.325) (-1.851) (-2.659) (0.919) 
Early Voluntary Late After Mandatory -0.048*** -0.285 -0.001 0.005*** 
 (-3.098) (-1.084) (-0.253) (2.564) 
Late Voluntary Early After Mandatory -0.015 -0.071 -0.001 0.003 
 (-1.067) (-0.292) (-0.394) (1.442) 
Late Voluntary Late After Mandatory 0.003 0.385 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.181) (1.576) (3.388) (3.780) 
First Time Mandatory Early After 
Mandatory 0.029* 1.566*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (1.878) (5.799) (3.795) (4.232) 
First Time Mandatory Late After 
Mandatory 0.032** 1.638*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
 (2.423) (6.939) (9.086) (7.405) 
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Table 6. (Continued) 
 
Control Variables 
     
Log (Market Value t-1) -0.037*** 0.157*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-15.394) (2.951) (-9.130) (7.674) 
Log (Share Turnover t-1) -0.050*** -0.606*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-31.621) (-17.365) (-21.221) (-23.162) 
Log (Return Variability t-1) -0.009 0.474*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 
 (-1.452) (3.332) (14.365) (11.538) 
Log (Total Assets) -0.002 -0.372*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-0.808) (-7.332) (-4.570) (-4.561) 
Financial Leverage 0.023* 1.700*** 0.014*** 0.006*** 
 (1.846) (6.159) (7.612) (3.443) 
Asset Growth -0.026*** -0.202* -0.004*** -0.003 
 (-5.054) (-1.709) (-4.580) (-3.891) 
Market Benchmark 25.596 20.095* 1.190*** -1.008* 
 (1.169) (1.659) (3.883) (-1.857) 
R 0.694 0.414 0.659 0.620 
R square 0.482 0.172 0.434 0.385 
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Table 6. (Continued) 
The sample period starts in 2001 and ends in 2007. As treatment sample we choose firms from Germany with a market capitalization of at least 
EUR 10 million. The benchmark sample consists of firms from non-IFRS adoption countries as well as firms from Germany that do not mandate the 
application of IFRS. For the selection of the benchmark countries see Table 2. We split the IFRS observations into three groups: (1) Early Voluntary 
comprises the firms switching to IFRS initially between the years 2001 and 2002. (2) Late Voluntary includes all firms switching to IFRS between 
the years 2003 and 2004. (3) First time mandatory marks all firms applying IFRS for the first time after it became mandatory in Germany. We 
examine these groups for the time after the mandatory IFRS adoption year. We differentiate between reportings that were announced early after 
mandatory and late after mandatory, which refers to the second and third yearly financial statements, respectively, after the adoption of IFRS 
became mandatory. We use proxies for market liquidity to reflect the quality of financial reporting. The proxies consist of four different variables: 
Zero Returns is the proportion of trading days with zero daily stock returns out of all potential trading days in a given year. Illiquidity or price 
impact is the yearly mean of a variation of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure i.e., daily absolute stock return divided by trading volume (we 
multiply the coefficient by 10,000 for expositional purpose). Total Trading Costs are a comprehensive estimate of yearly average round trip 
transaction costs based on a series of daily security and aggregate market returns, as developed by Lesmond et al. (1999). Bid-Ask Spreads are the 
yearly median of daily quoted spreads, measured at the end of each trading day as the difference between the bid price and the ask price divided by 
the mid-point. We define the control variables as follows: Market Value is stock price (in EUR) times the number of shares outstanding. We 
compute share turnover as annual EUR trading volume divided by market value of outstanding equity. Return variability is the annual standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns. Total assets are reported in EUR millions. Financial Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Asset 
Growth describes the one-year percentage change in total assets. Market Benchmark is defined as yearly mean of the dependent variable from 
observations in countries that do not mandate the adoption of IFRS (benchmark sample, excluded observations from Germany). For the first four 
mentioned control variables we use the natural log of the raw values. Where indicated, we lag the variables by one year. Statistical significance is 
indicated at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with ***, **, and *, respectively, based on the approximative two-sided t-test from Gauß (t-statistics in 
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parentheses). We obtain the necessary data to estimate the model from Bloomberg, Datastream, Reuters and the International Monetary Fund. For 
detailed data descriptions see the appendix. 
